Sustaining American Maritime Influence by Harvey, John et al.
Calhoun: The NPS Institutional Archive
Faculty and Researcher Publications Faculty and Researcher Publications Collection
2013-09
Sustaining American Maritime Influence
Harvey, John
ProQuest LLC
Sustaining American Maritime Influence
 Harvey, John, Admiral; Hughes, Wayne, CaptainView
Profile; Kline, Jeffrey, CaptainView Profile; Schwartz, Zachary, LieutenantView Profile. United
States Naval Institute. Proceedings139.9 (Sep 2013): 46-51.
http://hdl.handle.net/10945/48736
Document 1 of 1
 
Sustaining American Maritime Influence  





Abstract: Along with several others, the authors believe the nation needs to emphasize a maritime strategy at a
time when budgetary limitations threaten to severely curtail the national-defense posture. Former Chief of Naval
Operations Admiral Gary Roughead has argued that naval-force numbers must be sustained even if ground-
force numbers are reduced. A similar appraisal of the advantages of small combatants applies in other regions
of the world. Inexpensive missile ships are suitable for joint operations with South Korea in the Yellow Sea
where the large, multipurpose warships have not ventured. In the Persian Gulf's very constrained battle space
amidst a proliferation of precision weapons a squadron or two of missile corvettes would be as advantageous
tactically as a CVN, or SSNs, or DDGs. The Navy and the nation should accept that the short-term budget
challenge and its effects on the Fleet are likely to be a long-term constraint. The expanding littoral battle space




Full text: Headnote 
If the United is to maintain its naval supremacy worldwide, it must look beyond the ship designs currently in the
construction pipeline.  
Along with several others, we believe the nation needs to emphasize a maritime strategy at a time when
budgetary limitations threaten to severely curtail our national-defense posture.1 Former Chief of Naval
Operations Admiral Gary Roughead has argued that naval-force numbers must be sustained even if ground-
force numbers are reduced.2 We agree, but we also assert that even if the Navy budget is not reduced, our
planned force levels will very likely decrease. The American people must anticipate that even under favorable
budget conditions, the Navy will shrink in numbers of ships and aircraft if we continue to procure only the
designs now in current and planned programs. We believe the Navy must reflect on its long-established set of
presumed responsibilities and the need to reorder or reduce them, doing so with full cognizance of all relevant
stakeholders in the process.  
To illustrate what is involved in sustaining American international maritime influence, the implications of the
announced focus shift to the Pacific must first be examined. Here, we emphasize influence and take as our
theme: keeping the peace by being prepared for wartime actions where our strength lies while communicating
our advantages at sea to China, our allies, and other friends in East Asia. Elsewhere authors Kline and Hughes
have shown, through papers and campaign analyses, that to a great extent a U.S. Fleet that can keep the
peace in the western Pacific is also well-suited to respond to conflicts in Southwest Asia and other parts of the
world, but not in all places at once.3 Our viewpoint is intended to inform strategists and assist in the alignment
of the 21st-century Fleet in the western Pacific by focusing on operations (the ways) and force compositions
(the means).  
The world has awakened to the expanding activities of China, especially at sea. This is all to the good, but
opinions being published about the significance of current events in the present environment-notably People's
Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) claims that exceed international law and conventions in the East and South China
Seas-have limited value in shaping a U.S. Navy designed to serve the nation through much of this century. Our
Navy builds ships and aircraft with intended lifetimes of 30 and even 40 years, and so the Fleet cannot be
designed wholly around current policies and world events.  
Some long-lived "two-stage systems"-such as nuclear carriers (CVNs), ballistic-missile submarines (SSBNs),
and guided-missile destroyers (DDGs)- attenuate the problem because they have the ability to change their
"second stage:" the aircraft in our CVNs and the missile types and mix in our SSBNs and DDGs. To the same
end, the littoral combat ship (LCS) has been designed to carry modules intended to be quickly and affordably
replaced. In this discussion, we will illustrate the ability to retain American influence in changing circumstances
by demonstrating the flexible characteristics of a flotilla of small missile corvettes. The fact that such a flotilla
has a mission focused on littoral waters does not mean it is deficient in adaptability. These missile combatants-
and other kinds of smaller vessels, too-must necessarily be important future contributors to sustained American
influence. Not only are flotilla ships able to change their roles in different geopolitical environments but, because
they are inexpensive, they can be replaced with more up-todate designs every 10 to 15 years. First- and
secondgeneration designs need not be scrapped but will be useful in less demanding theaters for constabulary
operations, or they can be transferred to partners trained to employ them. Flotillas will be flexible across the
range of naval operations as evidenced by their ability to accept different roles in alternative U.S.-China
relationships.  
Four Circumstances with China  
* In times of cooperation: China can display good will by inviting U.S. Navy warships to visit mainland ports and
Hainan. Port calls by small ships in suitable numbers, accompanied by an LCS or two, will particularly foster
warm relations by performing most of the usual activities associated with friendly state-to-state "engagement"
when a CVN or a nuclear attack submarine (SSN) might be neither as welcome nor as suitable.  
* In times of competition: The flotilla ships can be exploited in joint exercises with allies such as Japan,
Australia, Singapore, and South Korea, and also other East or South Asian countries whose friendship we
value, to include India, Thailand, the Philippines, Vietnam, Malaysia, Brunei, and Indonesia. Many of these
states may offer us operating bases when it is in their interest to have an American naval presence. Small ships
can more easily be accommodated and carry less political risk to the host nation's leadership than basing our
large combatants.  
* Should a confrontation arise: Divisions or squadrons of 4, 8, or even 16 flotilla combatants, enhanced by aerial
surveillance and often by Asian partners' ships and aircraft, can demonstrate our firm but peace-seeking
commitment to enforce international law. Flotilla ships are the best ones to risk when a surprise attack is
possible and our forces are constrained to operate under stringent rules of engagement when international
relations or national policy inhibits our ability to attack effectively first.  
* Flotilla employment in times of conflict: Such a scenario would be radically different. Small missile corvettes in
suitable numbers can be sent in harm's way to make swift surprise attacks on large enemy ships using medium-
or long-range surface-to-surface missiles at times and places of our choosing, aided by a variety of detection
and tracking systems. Flotilla vessels can, more easily than big ships, employ various forms of concealment in
water cluttered with islands, shoals, fishing boats, commercial traffic, and oil rigs. In addition, local tactical
offensive operations conducted by the flotilla are less dependent on nonorganic information systems and
therefore are more resilient to loss of satellites and other communication systems.  
Worldwide Advantages  
A similar appraisal of the advantages of small combatants applies in other regions of the world. Inexpensive
missile ships are suitable for joint operations with South Korea in the Yellow Sea where our large, multipurpose
warships have not ventured. In the Persian Gulf's very constrained battle space amidst a proliferation of
precision weapons a squadron or two of missile corvettes-8 or 16 of them- would be as advantageous tactically
as a CVN, or SSNs, or DDGs.  
Should another situation arise in Georgia that we wish to constrain, a squadron of small missile combatants
based in a Balkan state or Turkey and operating cooperatively with Black Sea navies would probably be the
most effective way to confront Russia in those restricted waters. The Baltic is another confined sea in which
U.S. flotilla ships, along with LCSs and joint high-speed vessels (JHSVs) could train with Sweden, Germany, or
other Baltic states to familiarize us with coastal operations in the region. Similar advantages were recognized
during the Cold War by NATO's CINCSOUTH in 1969, who stated a requirement for fast patrol boats to meet an
aggressive Soviet presence in his restricted Mediterranean waters.4  
Two decades ago a Naval Postgraduate School (NPS) study conducted for the late Vice Admiral Art Cebrowski,
then president of the Naval War College, designed a "streetfighter." The detailed naval architectural work
resulted in the design of a 600-ton, high-speed "Sea Lance" missile ship for littoral operations.5 At the time two
types of support were envisioned: When a large-scale Fleet operation is involved, then the streetfighters are
covered and sustained by the big blue-water ships while they operate on point. When they operated
independently in coastal waters, then tender support was conjectured.6 Exploratory tender support for a large
flotilla of 100 missile ships located in many places was disturbingly expensive in manpower and construction
costs.  
However, we believe our previously outlined worldwide survey-as well as the clearly attractive current Navy
plans to base the LCS overseas in Singapore-demonstrates that in real-world circumstances we will usually be
collaborating with a state where the ships can be supported ashore. Tender services might be desirable for out-
of-the-way places, and so the personnel costs of two or three interim alternatives-to include auxiliary ships or
amphibious-assault ships such as the USS Ponce (LPD-15)-should be included in the cost of deploying flotilla
squadrons.  
A Campaign Test  
Co-author Schwartz has compared a U.S. submarine campaign's effectiveness with that of a flotilla of missile
combatants. In his tests the purpose is to deny China the use of the waters within the South and East China
Seas by attacking Chinese shipping and PLAN warships. Since the size of the contested region and submarine
sweep rates in the China seas are uncertain, he adapted a campaign model developed by operations analyst
Henry Young, whose goal in the 1980s was to explore U.S. Navy SSN attack rates and results against the
considerably more numerous but qualitatively inferior Soviet submarine force.7  
In his unclassified thesis, Schwartz updated the numbers of ships, used a consensus of best estimates for his
search and attack rates, and postulated combat outcomes for a variety of input conditions. He extended
Young's work by including attacks on commercial traffic, surface warships, and PLAN submarines in proportion
to the density of the three kinds of targets. And he compared the results with the historical record in World War
II and in Young's study.8 We found nothing jarring in the results; to wit, losses inflicted were substantial, while
our submarine losses were tolerable but not insignificant.  
After completing his thesis Schwartz used the same campaign methodology to compare his estimated S SN
performance with a surface flotilla's performance. None of us put enough faith in the inputs to publish the
outputs, but we believe he has accurately demonstrated predictably contrasting outcomes. As was true in the
record of actual campaigns, the submarines are slowacting because their search and engagement rates are
limited. The number of submarines is capped realistically-Schwartz employed between 10 and 30 SSNs-and so
the attrition proceeds slowly. By contrast, flotilla ships are faster acting because the detection, targeting, and
attack rates are greater. Schwartz "deployed" only 24 missile corvettes that operated in 12 two-ship task
elements to seek and attack Chinese commerce and surface warships. (If one ship was put out of action, she
was abandoned, and her 12-man crew was rescued by the second vessel, which then withdrew from further
attacks.) A major finding was that the flotilla ships, each carrying eight surface-to-surface missiles, quickly
expended all their weapons in this target-rich sea environment. Because they fought many engagements
rapidly, the flotilla ships also suffered attrition faster.  
Perhaps the most significant point of comparison is the radical difference in the pace of the campaigns. If one
wants many attacks in a short time, he should employ surface missile ships. If he wants slow-acting but
sustainable attacks to give time for China to reflect on our advantage, back off, and negotiate an end to the
shooting, then submarines are preferred. If maximum hitting rates are desired, then a combination of surface
and subsurface attacks gives us that option. Most important, we believe Schwartz adequately demonstrates
that, by adding flotilla ships and offering our commanders a significant mix of additional operational choices, we
will have a formidable and flexible capability that neither China nor any other prospective opponent can ignore-
or match. One reviewer of the work points out an option we did not explore. In principle, the surface flotilla need
not operate full-out, but can stretch its attacks over a longer time to let China consider a negotiated end to its
illegal activities at sea.  
A Littoral Missile Ship Design  
Knowing how flotilla ships are expected to complement a shrinking number of major blue-water warships and
aircraft is the best way to arrive at their design specifications. It is easy to see that our ships ought to look very
much like those in other navies that have more experience in littoral operations than we do. Partly to draw from
the experience of foreign navies, the NPS established a Littoral Operations Center in collaboration with the
Swedish and Singaporean governments, domestic and foreign defense industries, and select research
establishments.  
By surveying several designs such as the Singaporean Victory class (600 tons), the Swedish Visby class (650
tons), and the planned Taiwanese Hsun Hai (Swift Sea) class (about 800 tons), we see the common
characteristics among these and other littoral fighters. Our missile corvettes are envisioned to share well-
proven, tactically tested technologies that make them an affordable and effective symmetric response to near-
shore mischief by any adversary.  
Common characteristics include a low radar crosssection monohull ship of 500-700 tons displacement, top
speed of 30-35 knots, eight 60- to 80-nautical-mile surface-to-surface missiles, a 57- or 76-mm gun, active soft-
kill and short-range hard-kill defense systems, shortrange dual-purpose surface- and air-search radar, small
tactical unmanned aircraft, and a modest communications suite. The ship's minimum peacetime range at 18
knots cruising speed should be 3,000 nautical miles. We  
envision 15-day periods at sea, either for conducting peacetime training or for confrontational patrols in
contested waters. This will take a crew of about 30. In sharp contrast, unrestrained combat operations should
take only two or three days to conduct stealthy strike operations, so we envision removing all but the best-
trained cadre of about 15 in a crew to fight the ship and if necessary suffer its loss with minimum personnel
casualties. An  
initial target fleet of 64 missile corvettes composed of 8 squadrons of 8 ships each would cost less than 4
percent of the SCN (shipbuilding and conversion, Navy) budget, even if their first-line lifetime is only 16 years
and they are replaced at a rate of 4 new ships per year. Elsewhere,  
Professor Robert C. "Barney" Rubel of the Naval War College (see "Cede No Water," beginning on page 40)
has summarized the desired flotilla attributes as well as can be done: Forces  
on scene in peacetime and during a crisis must have the ability to disrupt enemy aggression or inflict
operationally or strategically significant harm, and they must be able to do this after riding out a first strike. This
suggests the distribution of offensive power-missiles most easily-among numerous platforms and making those
platforms hard to target . . . [with] new kinds of forward forces that are less strategically mobile but more
tactically suitable for the operational conditions that are emerging in the Persian Gulf, South China Sea, and
elsewhere. How  
to Implement It The  
Navy and the nation should accept that the short-term budget challenge and its effects on the Fleet are likely to
be a long-term constraint. 5 The expanding littoral battle space | and shrinking budget together demand | the
realignment of U.S. Navy forces. 1 The current cost per unit for CVNs, = SSNs, amphibious ships, naval aircraft,
and investments in systems to support cyber operations within a shrinking Navy budget top-line will inescapably
result in fewer such large warships. A smaller Fleet in terms of tonnage can be sustained or even expanded in
numbers by building a variety of more affordable, distributable ships, exemplified by a flotilla of small, lethal
combatants costing only a small percentage of the Navy budget to build, man, and operate. Such a flotilla will
go far toward sustaining worldwide American maritime influence and the ability to distribute our forces in many
places. With  
the added flexibility of offensively potent missile corvettes, a rich mix of combined operations with key allies and
partners around the world will sustain a collaborative forward U.S. Navy presence. Accomplishing the strategy
for peace, crisis, and war will take some original thinking in regard to ends, ways, and means. The strategy will
impose fewer deployments and operations on the inevitably smaller number of the big, expensive ships
comprising the current Fleet by maintaining, in part, a more sustainable overseas presence with LCS and flotilla
ships, and also perhaps by adding other affordable patrol vessels. As  
simple and obvious as these conclusions seem to be, to achieve them entails a demanding set of simultaneous,
interlocking actions by Congress, the Office of the Secretary of Defense, Navy leadership, and our allies and
partners. One action is to make the case with all vested interests for an affordable, long-term national maritime
strategy. The second is to quickly design, fund, and build the first generation of flotilla ships. The third is to
adopt and pursue a policy of greater collaboration with select allies and partners. And the fourth is to arrive at a
realistic mix of ships and aircraft in a severely budget-constrained Fleet.  
Sidebar 
A rigid-hull inflatable boat from the littoral combat ship USS Freedom (LCS-1) takes a visit, board, search, and
seizure team to the Malaysian frigate KDJabatduring a compliant boarding exercise on 20 June during
Cooperation Afloat Readiness and Training (CARAT) 2013 in Malaysia. "Port calls by small ships in suitable
numbers, accompanied by an LCS or two, "the authors contend, "will particularly foster warm relations."  
Sidebar 
Lieutenant Commander Justin Hsu (right), lead exercise planner for U.S. Naval Forces Europe-Africa/U.S. 6th
Fleet, briefs German navy Commander Jens Herfurth during BALTOPS 2013 on 11 April. "The Baltic is another
confined sea in which U.S. flotilla ships... could train with Sweden, Germany, or other Baltic states to familiarize
us with coastal operations in the region."  
Sidebar 
Swedish sailors pipe then-Chief of Naval Operations Admiral Gary Roughead ashore at Naval Base Karlskrona
after getting under way with the l//sfty-class corvette Nykopingin August 2010. The 650-ton l^/s/ry design is one
being favored by the authors for construction of U.S. missile corvettes that can ensure a "symmetric response to
near-shore mischief by any adversary."  
The Republic of Singapore navy Victory-class corvette l/a/Zanf leads the way during exercise CARAT 2013 in
the South China Sea, involving more than 700 sailors and Marines. The Naval Postgraduate School
"established a Littoral Operations Center in collaboration with the Swedish and Singaporean governments,
domestic and foreign defense industries, and select research establishments."  
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